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Article 5

Is the Sky the Limit?
PATENT IMPLICATIONS OF DISCOVERIES MADE IN
OUTER SPACE
Max Stul Oppenheimer†
INTRODUCTION: THE PATENT CHALLENGE OF SPACE EXPLORATION
It has been less than a century since space flight was the
province of science fiction.1 Sixty years ago, space flight was the
province of a few advanced nations2 and manned space exploration
remained the province of science fiction3; fifty years ago, manned

† Princeton University, B.S. cum laude; Harvard Law School, J.D.; Professor,
University of Baltimore School of Law.
1 In 1920, under the title “A Severe Strain on Credulity” the New York Times
ridiculed Dr. Robert Hutching Goddard’s proposal to launch a rocket capable of reaching the
moon. See A Severe Strain on Credulity, N.Y. TIMES: TOPICS OF THE TIMES (Jan. 13, 1920),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1920/01/13/102738081.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GEK7-CZWF]. “[A]fter the rocket quits our air . . . its flight would be neither
accelerated nor maintained by the explosion of the charges it then might have left. To claim
that it would be is to deny a fundamental law of dynamics and only Dr. Einstein and his
chosen dozen . . . are licensed to do that.” Id. The New York Times published what might
be considered a retraction in 2001—nearly thirty years after a rocket, employing Dr.
Goddard’s design, landed on the moon. See Tom Kuntz, 150th Anniversary: 1851–2001; The
Facts That Got Away, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/
news/150th-anniversary-1851-2001-the-facts-that-got-away.html [https://perma.cc/R58UD9QA]. In addition, the U. S. government paid $1 million to settle suits alleging
infringement of Dr. Goddard’s U. S. patents 2,395,113 (“method for feeding combustion
liquids to rocket apparatus”), and 2,397,657 and 2,397,659 (“control mechanism for a rocket
apparatus”). Frequently Asked Questions About Dr. Robert H. Goddard, CLARK UNIVERSITY
http://www2.clarku.edu/research/archives/goddard/faq.cfm [https://perma.cc/9FX4-R5AV].
2 Sputnik I, the first rocket to achieve low earth orbit, was launched by the
Soviet Union in 1957; the United States followed with its own low earth orbit rocket in
1958. Steven J. Dick, 50 Years of NASA History, NASA (May 28, 2008) https://
www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/historyLetter.html [https://perma.cc/GL5Y-BRFA].
3 The first human would not reach space until Yuri Gagarin flew the Soviet
Union’s Vostok I in a single orbit around the Earth in 1961. See Paul D. Spudis, Lunar
Exploration: Past and Future, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/lunar
Exploration.html [https://perma.cc/466G-VGEW]; The Flight of Vostok 1, EUROPEAN
SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/ESA_history/50_years_
of_humans_in_space/The_flight_of_Vostok_1 [https://perma.cc/8KDE-SML3]. At that
time, Arthur C. Clarke’s “Sentinel of Eternity” had been published, but was still a decade
away from being brought to the movie screen as Stanley Kubrick’s classic “2001: A Space
Odyssey.” See Arthur C. Clarke, Sentinel of Eternity, TEN STORY FANTASY, Spring 1951;
2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 1968).
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lunar exploration was a stunning achievement;4 ten years ago,
human space travel was the exclusive realm of governments,5 only
three of which maintained any kind of sustained presence in space.6
Today, private companies have launched human space flights7 and
orbital rockets that carry experiments and cargo to the International
Space Station (ISS),8 while NASA’s New Horizons mission has gone
beyond the known planets and on New Year’s Day 2019 reached
Ultima Thule, an object 4 billion miles from our sun.9
In the next ten years, private companies plan to reach the
moon and planets,10 while NASA is developing a plan to land
4 See Vic Lang’at Jr., Which Countries Have Been on the Moon?, WORLD ATLAS
(Dec. 12, 2018) https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-countries-have-been-on-themoon.html [https://perma.cc/AC5X-YHBE]. In 1969, the United States was the first
nation to land a human (Neil Armstrong) on the moon and is still the only nation to have
done so. Brian Dunbar, The Moon, NASA (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/moon
[https://perma.cc/5A43-E9EL].
5 In all, only 12 men have walked on the moon and no one has reached another
planet. For a list of lunar astronauts, see Nancy Atkinson, How Many People Have Walked
on the Moon, UNIVERSE TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.universetoday.com/55512/howmany-people-have-walked-on-the-moon/ [https://perma.cc/LPD3-7T8A]. The first
nongovernmental spaceflight did not occur until June 21, 2004. Tim Sharp, SpaceShipOne:
The First Private Spacecraft, SPACE (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.space.com/16769spaceshipone-first-private-spacecraft.html [https://perma.cc/ZXG6-HZLQ].
6 The Soviet Union maintained the Mir space station, the U.S. maintained the
Skylab space station (now maintained jointly as the International Space Station), and
China maintained the Tiangong space station. See Deborah Bloom & Kate Hunt, China
Launches Tiangong-2 Space Lab, CNN (Sept. 25, 2016, 2:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2016/09/15/asia/china-launches-tiangong-2-space-lab/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZM4D8HTA]; Elizabeth Howell, Skylab: First U.S. Space Station, SPACE (July 11, 2018), https://
www.space.com/19607-skylab.html [https://perma.cc/5BNW-LRST]; China’s Shenzhou 11
Docks at Tiangong 2 Space Station, BBC NEWS (Oct.19, 2016), www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-37700404 [https://perma.cc/YZ8A-KV9Z]; NASA, International Cooperation, https://
www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/cooperation/index.html [https://perma.cc/7BBN-64C6].
7 The private company SpaceShipOne launched a suborbital flight in 2004,
enabling it to win the X Prize. Dan Brekke, SpaceShipOne Back on Course, WIRED (July
7, 2004, 11:09 AM), https://www.wired.com/2004/07/spaceshipone-back-on-course/
[https://perma.cc/8YWS-XSUY]; Launching a New Space Industry, ANSARI XPRIZE,
https://ansari.xprize.org/ [https://perma.cc/DJ6P-QWKV].
8 In 2012, SpaceX became the first private company to deliver cargo to the ISS and
has launched 16 resupply missions to the ISS. Dragon Resupply Mission (CRS-16), SPACEX
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.spacex.com/news/2018/12/05/dragon-resupply-mission-crs-16
[https://perma.cc/QWP8-ALKA]; Press Release, NASA, Release 14-256 NASA Chooses
American Companies to Transport U.S. Astronauts to International Space Station (Sept. 16,
2014), https://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/september/nasa-chooses-american-companiesto-transport-us-astronauts-to-international [https://perma.cc/8N4D-Z3HH].
9 Kenneth Chang, Snowman-like Photos of Ultima Thule Sent Home by NASA’s
New Horizon Spacecraft, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/
science/ultima-thule-pictures-new-horizons.html [https://perma.cc/8XPF-8QLV].
10 Leonard David, Will Commercial Space Travel Blast Off in 2014?, SPACE
(Jan. 11, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.space.com/24249-commercial-space-travelblasts-off-2014.html [https://perma.cc/3P76-A9LD]; see also Alan Boyle, Jeff Bezos Lifts
Curtain on Blue Origin Rocket Factory, Lays Out Grand Plan for Space Travel That
Spans Hundreds of Years, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 8 2016, 7:58 PM), https://
www.geekwire.com/2016/jeff-bezos-lifts-curtain-blue-origin-rocket-factory-vision-space/
[https://perma.cc/62C8-B3NW]. See generally Elizabeth Howell, SpaceX: First Private
Flights to Space Station, SPACE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.space.com/18853-
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humans on Mars by the 2030s,11 with the first step planned for 2020
when an unmanned craft is to be sent into deep space to retrieve an
asteroid and push it into lunar orbit for study.12
While perhaps only a footnote in this story of incredible
scientific achievement, the evolution of space travel has implications
for law in general and patent law in particular.13 The possibility of
discovering useful materials or technology in outer space was
recognized early in the space era,14 but the patent law consequences
of such discoveries have not been addressed completely.
In 1984, Congress recognized the private economic potential
of space and set out to regulate it in the Commercial Space Launch
Act, whose purposes included “promot[ing] economic growth and
entrepreneurial activity through use of the space environment for
peaceful purposes.”15 In the relatively brief period since space travel
has become feasible,16 patent law has also been modified to solve
many of the new problems posed by the possibility of economic
activity and technological development in outer space.17 Other
spacex.html [https://perma.cc/H259-9SGS] (outlining SpaceX corporation’s plans for
commercial space travel).
11 Gary Daines, NASA’s Journey to Mars, NASA (Aug. 7, 2017), https://
www.nasa.gov/content/nasas-journey-to-mars [https://perma.cc/4Q2M-97KS]; Amy Klamper,
White House Panel Spells Out Human Spaceflight Options for NASA, SPACE (Sept. 8, 2009,
8:01 PM EDT), http://www.space.com/7255-white-house-panel-spells-human-spaceflightoptions-nasa.html [https://perma.cc/UZD7-NVCR].
12 Daines, supra note 11.
13 There are three types of patents issued by the United States government.
“Patents issued under § 161 are referred to as ‘plant patents,’ which are distinguished
from § 101 utility patents and § 171 design patents.” J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133 n.5 (2001). While it is conceivable that space
exploration will discover new plants that might raise issues similar to those discussed,
the focus of this article is on utility patent issues; the term “patent” will refer to utility
patents unless specifically stated otherwise.
14 In a 1959 article, Wolf Haber proposed a model space treaty which included
a provision that “[t]he contracting States recognize that space and celestial matter are
potential sources of raw materials . . . . They, therefore, undertake to develop these
potentials in concert for the common good of mankind.” Wolf Haber, A Draft Convention
on International Law of Space, 38 MICH. ST. B. J. 24, 25 (1959).
15 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055, 3055
(1984) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. § 50901(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
16 In comparison, English common law dates back nearly one thousand years.
JOHN LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW & BRUCE SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (2d ed. 2009); ROSCOE
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 5 (1921); Mary Ann Glendon, Andrew D.E.
Lewis, & Albert Roland Kiralfy, Common Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (July 26, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-law [https://perma.cc/CR4D-385N] (dating
the common law from the Norman conquest of England in 1066).
17 While the concept of outer space is probably intuitive, it is helpful to define
the dividing line between the application of “terrestrial”—or traditional territorial—law
and the application of “space law”. A helpful set of definitions is provided in an article
from the dawn of the space age:
“Space” is that area immediately above airspace and extending outward from
the surface of the earth to infinity, and which surrounds all celestial
matter. . . . “Airspace” is that area immediately superjacent to the earth, which
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problems remain to be resolved, new problems will arise, and even
those problems that appear to have been solved have yet to face the
test of practical application. This article focuses on one effect of the
emergence of extraterrestrial activity from the exclusive and
occasional realm of government activity to the possible realm of
everyday private activity: the impact on the definition of prior art
under patent law, which in turn has an impact on patentability of
inventions (both those made in outer space and those made on
Earth) and the extent to which the benefits of activities in space can
be imported to earth. As currently written, the patent statute does
not explicitly address the prior art status of inventions and
discoveries made in outer space and whether future extraterrestrial
discoveries might invalidate existing patents.
This article proceeds in the following Parts: Part I reviews
the basics of patent law and patent theory in order to understand
the problems that private entry into the field of space exploration
and exploitation poses for the patent system. Part II identifies
problems posed for traditional patent law by the possibility of
extraterrestrial discoveries and summarizes those problems which
Congress has addressed. Next, Part III identifies a category of
issues—the status of extraterrestrial discoveries as prior art under
patent law—that still requires attention, and presents two simple
scenarios providing context for the policy considerations bearing on
how patent law should treat extraterrestrial prior art. Part IV
offers a precedential framework for addressing the problem.
Finally, Part V suggests an approach to analyzing extraterrestrial
prior art that, while contrary to a literal reading of current law, is
consistent with the constitutional mandate to “promote progress”18
through the patent laws and is supported by early precedent.
I.

A CRASH COURSE IN PATENT THEORY AND LAW

Monopolies are generally considered undesirable.19
According to economic theory, monopolies raise consumer prices

is subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty and control of the State above which
it lies. It extends from the surface of the earth to a height where the presence
of air is so negligible as to provide less than Y per cent of aerodynamic lift, at
a forward speed of B miles per hour.
Haber, supra 14, at 24.
18 Article I Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966).
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and stifle innovation.20 Yet, the Constitution provides authority to
grant limited term exclusivity21 and, since the first Congress,
patents (which are in effect government-sanctioned monopolies22)
have been part of U.S. law.23 In the words of Thomas Jefferson,
patents provide an incentive for “things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment” of a monopoly.24
Patents are thought to be “worth the embarrassment” of a
monopoly because innovators often have the option of profiting from
their innovations without providing the public benefit of disclosure.25
Patents provide an incentive to disclose how to make and use
inventions. In exchange for public disclosure (which destroys trade
20 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant
stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”); see
United States v. Corn Prods. Refining Co., 234 F. 964, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (recognizing
monopoly “power to exclude others from entering [an] industry”).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8.
22 The Supreme Court has observed that “a patent is not, accurately speaking,
a monopoly . . . . The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege
for . . . a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant . . . . An inventor
deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery.” United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). In the broader sense of the term,
patents may be viewed as monopolies: they constrain others from competing with the
owner of the patent within the scope of its claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
23 The tradition of U.S. patents reaches back to pre-Revolution England as well
as to Colonial America. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973); Pennock
v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17 (1829); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress
of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause
of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (1994). South Carolina had a
general patent statute. An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub.
Laws 333-34. Ga. An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1786) and N.H.
Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1783) had intellectual property
statutes broad enough to cover both copyrights and patents. Under the Articles of
Confederation, the power to grant patents was not among the rights granted to the central
government and was therefore reserved to the states. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art.
II; Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the
Key to World Patent Harmony, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 445, 475 n.160 (2007)
[hereinafter Oppenheinmer, Harmonization]. The power was granted to the national
government under the Constitution through what has variously been called the Intellectual
Property Clause, the Copyright Clause, and the Patent Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8; Max Stul Oppenheimer, Defending Breakthrough Innovation: The History and Future of
State Patent Law, 20 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1, 3–7 (2016).
24 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [https://perma.cc/XG3E-Z6BV].
25 They can do so by relying on trade secret protection. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). The trade secret option has been made more
attractive by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 5(a) , 125 Stat.
284, 297 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)) which made it a defense
to patent infringement if the alleged infringer could show use of the patented invention—
even in secret—more than a year before the patent application was filed. Thus, the Act
eliminated one disadvantage of maintaining an innovation as a trade secret: the risk
that someone else might independently invent the same technology, patent it, and use
the patent to prevent the innovator from using it.
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secrecy),26 patents provide broader27—but limited-term28—
protection for inventions.29 This public disclosure is thought to be of
greater benefit to society than trade secret use, because it allows
others to learn from the invention and build on it.30
While it is an article of constitutional faith31 that patents
provide the public benefits of increased inventive activity and
disclosure of inventions, there are those who have presented
convincing arguments to the contrary. For example, in the
eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson observed that “generally
speaking, other nations have thought that these monopolies
produce more embarrassment than advantage to society, and it
may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of
invention, are as fruitful as England in new and useful devices.”32
Two hundred years later, Josh Lerner produced the data to support
Jefferson’s intuition. Examining 177 changes in patent policy from
1852 to 1998 in sixty of the largest economies, he concluded that
26 One requirement for maintaining a trade secret is that the information not
be publicly known. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1985). Patents
are published, at the latest, when issued.
27 Trade secrets only grant the right to prevent “misappropriation,” which is
defined as the “disclosure or use of a trade secret” acquired by “improper means.” Id.
§ 1(2)(ii)(A). Thus, independent invention is a defense to trade secret infringement, and
most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the
protection of trade secret law. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
476 (1974). Patents grant the exclusive right to manufacture, use, sale or importation,
even against reverse engineering and even against those who independently develop the
same technology. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
28 Trade secrets last as long as the definitional requirements are met:
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and lack of public knowledge. See UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS 1985). Patents typically last for twenty years
from the date an application is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
29 A report on the effects of patents commissioned by the Federal Trade
Commission succinctly summarized the pros and cons of the system:

Awarding patent rights . . . is not costless. An innovator whose patent confers
market power can raise prices or depress output (and . . . broad initial patent
rights can sometimes interfere with follow-on innovation). These effects may
be the price of progress, if the promise of a patent grant is necessary to elicit
an invention, its disclosure, or investment in it. If invention, disclosure, or
investment would have occurred even without the promise of a patent award,
however, these costs hurt consumers unjustifiedly.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1–2 (2003) (footnotes omitted). The report further noted
“competition to win a patent right may drive a race to innovate. Indeed, firms competing
to innovate may approach research problems differently, increasing the chances of
successful innovation.” Id. at 2.
30 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511
(1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes
for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . .’”
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427
(2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 24.
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“[a]djusting for the change in overall patenting, the impact of
patent protection-enhancing shifts on applications by residents
was actually negative.”33
Evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, Congress believes
(as the Constitution commands) that “[i]f the United States is to
maintain its competitive edge in the global economy, it needs a
system that will support and reward all innovators with high quality
patents.”34 Recognizing Jefferson’s concerns, the patent statute35 is
at least designed to attempt to limit patent grants to inventions
“worth the . . . embarrassment.”36
Arguably the most important step in assuring that the public
gets appropriate value for the patent monopoly is the requirement
that an applicant prepare and file a written application, describing
how to make and use the invention.37 This assures that the
fundamental bargain—a limited term monopoly in exchange for
disclosure—is met. Most applications are published approximately
eighteen months after filing,38 and all patents are published.39
The invention must fall within at least one of four statutory
categories: (1) machine; (2) manufacture; (3) composition of matter;

33 Josh Lerner, Patent Protection and Innovation over 150 Years 12, 27 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8977, 2002), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w8977.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DB7-HDB].
34 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011).
35 The constitutional authority to provide limited-term incentives for
innovation is exercised in Title 35 of the U. S. Code, regulations governing patents are
contained in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and specific internal rules
governing the handling of patent applications are contained in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP). It should be noted that, while many of the rules for each
are similar, there are actually three types of patents issued by the United States: utility
patents, design patents, and plant patents. The type which most people mean when
referring to a “patent” is the utility patent, and that is the meaning of the term “patent”
as used in this article.
36 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 24.
37 35 U.S.C. § 111; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) (2012). The process of obtaining a patent,
referred to as “patent prosecution,” is initiated by submitting the written application to the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). See Patent Prosecution Overview, JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/patents/patent-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/
9BDF-HVEJ]. The operation of the USPTO is outlined in a comprehensive guidance document
for patent examiners, known as the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP). See
generally MPEP (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018). Trade secrets, on the other hand, require no filing.
38 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 1.211 (2018); MPEP § 1309 (9th ed. Rev. 8
Jan. 2018).
39 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 154. The requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)—that “[t]he
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same”—assure
that the public receives adequate disclosure in exchange for the patent monopoly.
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or (4) process.40 The invention must also be useful,41 meaning,
under United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
guidelines, that the claimed invention has a “specific, substantial
and credible” use.42 The threshold for utility is not high,43 but the
invention must be able to work. At a minimum, it must not violate
the known laws of physics.44
The statute also requires that the invention be “novel.”45 If
the public already has access46 to the invention, there is no need
to grant a monopoly with a patent in order to get disclosure.47
Thus, beginning with the first patent statute,48 patents have been
available to novel inventions only, a requirement reflected in
Sections 101 and 102 of the current statute.49 Since patents are

40 “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel,
and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject
matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”). Certain types of inventions that fall within the literal
terms of the statute are not patentable because of judicially announced exceptions:
“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). “[P]henomena of
nature. . . . are part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
Whether a given claim covers statutory subject matter is a question of law and reviewed
without deference. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999). Nevertheless, “[t]he boundary between patentable and unpatentable subject
matter is not always a bright line.” In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Newman, P., concurring). The Supreme Court itself noted that the “line between a
patentable ‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.” Parker v. Flook
437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
41 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
42 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2107 (9th ed. 2015).
43 Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (An invention is useful
unless “it is incapable of serving any beneficial end”). See generally Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 532–36 (1966) (explaining the threshold for utility for patents).
44 Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956–57 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (A claim
that requires “accomplishing an unattainable result” is invalid.).
45 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2012).
46 In the patent context, “access” does not necessarily mean that the public realizes
what it has access to, under a doctrine known as “inherency.” This poses a particularly
difficult issue for the treatment of extraterrestrial prior art. See discussion infra Part III.
47 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1894) (if two identical
inventions are claimed, it is proper to reject the second as not “novel”).
48 The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
49 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides:

Inventions patentable—Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 102 provides (with exceptions related to publications by, or derived from, the
patent applicant):
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intended to provide an incentive to add to the public domain, a
patent cannot be granted for something that is already in the
public domain.50 The definition of public domain has been
modified from time to time, but fundamentally consists of
information51 available to the public prior to the applicant’s date
of invention52 and information available to the public more than a
year prior to the applicant’s priority date. This information is
collectively known as “prior art.”53
The statute also prevents granting patent monopolies on
trivial advances, i.e., those that would have been considered
“obvious” by someone of ordinary skill in the field54 who, under
the rules of the patent statute, is presumed to have complete

(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication,
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention; or
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent . . . .
“Public use” has been defined as use by a person other than the inventor who is under
no restriction by the inventor. There is an exception for experimental use of an invention
by or under control of the inventor in order to perfect the invention. Elizabeth v.
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 128, 135 (1877) (“[S]uch use is not a public use . . . so long as the
inventor is engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation.”); see also, e.g., Allied Colloids,
Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing the
requirements of experimental use).
50 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146–50 (1989)
(stating that Congress cannot remove information from the public domain because
removal would thwart the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts.) A claimed invention which is rejected for lack of novelty is referred to
as “anticipated” by the reference which shows that it is not novel. “[A] prior patent or
other publication to be an anticipation must bear within its four corners adequate
directions for the practice of the [invention].” Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co.,
124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 157
F.2d 154, 159–60 (1st Cir. 1946); Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Walcott Mach. Co., 32 F.2d
55, 58 (6th Cir. 1929).
51 Under prior law, there were two categories of information which formed the
public domain. Printed publications and patents anywhere in the world qualified, but other
acts qualified only if they occurred in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006). The
distinction was eliminated under current law. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012)).
52 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Under the pre-AIA statute, inventive activity
abroad could not be used to establish a date of invention unless the activity took place in
a North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or World Trade Organization (WTO)
country. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2006). Activities by individuals domiciled in the United States,
a NAFTA country, or a WTO country but serving outside those countries on behalf of one
of those countries could also qualify as covered inventive activity that could establish a
date of invention. Id. § 104(2)(A)–(C).
53 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). The applicant may be able to claim a priority date,
which is usually the date of the first application filed by the applicant which describes
the claimed invention, provided certain technical requirements are met.
54 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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knowledge of the prior art.55 While recognized by judicial
interpretation more than a century ago,56 the concept of
“obviousness” did not enter the patent statute until 1952.57
Under the standard, things which would be obvious to others of
ordinary skill in the relevant field are not patentable. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.58

The Supreme Court expanded its explanation of the
obviousness requirement in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc.: “[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would occur in
the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and
may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements,
deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”59 Finally, the
application must contain claims that define the invention and are
sufficiently specific to apprise the public of the scope of the
claimed patent rights.60
After the patent application is filed, the application is
examined by a patent examiner, who determines which, if any, of
the claims satisfy all of the statutory requirements for
patentability. Those which do are allowed, and form part of the
issued patent.61 Following the grant of a patent, the specification
and drawings are published, thereby destroying any trade secrets
which might have existed in the application.62 In return, the patent
owner is granted the right to stop others from making, using,

See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 265–67 (1851).
57 Bryson Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2012)).
58 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
59 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
60 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.”).
61 A patent application includes a description of the invention and how it
relates to the state of the art, and a separate portion that defines what the applicant
claims. MPEP § 608.01(c)-(d) (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018). Both portions together are
referred to as the patent “specification.” MPEP § 608.01(a). The only portion that may
be infringed, however, is the claim section. See MPEP 2100-7 (“The claims define the
property rights provided by a patent, and thus require careful scrutiny.”).
62 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(4).
55
56
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importing, selling, or offering to sell63 products incorporating the
claimed invention64 during the term of the patent.65
In litigation, issued patents (and each of their claims) are
presumed valid,66 but a litigant claiming that a patent is invalid
can rebut the presumption by showing that any of the conditions
of patentability described above were not met.67 An alleged
infringer may also defend by showing that there is not actually
infringement, by showing that the allegedly infringing activity is
not covered by the patent, by showing that the alleged infringer
is licensed to use the patented technology, or by showing that the
patent is unenforceable.68
Two additional points deserve mention: territoriality and
exclusivity. Traditional patent law is, unsurprisingly, territorial in
that it only governs activities within the United States.69 As
extraterrestrial activities became more common, the United States
and several other countries reached treaty agreements governing
the application of domestic patent law to activities in space.70
Additionally, with regard to exclusivity, patents are, as provided by
the Constitution, “exclusive” rights.71 The term does not mean that
the patent owner is the exclusive person with the affirmative right
to practice the patented invention;72 it means that the patent owner
may “exclude” others from practicing the patented invention.
Issues concerning in which territory activity must take place to
63 Id. § 271. There are also specific provisions regulating some of the more
obvious ways of avoiding a technical reading of the scope of patent protection: inducing
infringement by knowingly supplying a material component especially adapted for use
in infringing, id. § 271(c), or by supplying substantial portions of a patented invention so
as to induce the combination into the patented invention, id. § 271(f), or carrying out a
patented process outside the United States, then importing the product into the United
States, id. § 271(g). There are also special provisions, not here relevant, relating to
certain biological inventions and applications relating to FDA approval. Id. § 271(e).
64 The patent statute defines “claimed invention” as “the subject matter defined
by a claim in a patent or an application for a patent,” Id. § 100(j), and “invention” as
“invention or discovery.” Id. § 100(a). It also defines “process” to include “a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” Id. § 100(b).
65 The term of a patent is ordinarily the period “beginning on the date on which
the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application was first
filed in the United States.” Id. § 154(a)(2).
66 Id. § 282(a).
67 Id. § 282(b)(2)–(3).
68 Id. § 282(b)(1).
69 See id. § 271.
70 See infra Part II.
71 “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
72 A moment’s thought will illustrate why this is so. Suppose that one
individual invents and patents the wheel, and a second individual invents and patents
an automobile that includes four wheels. If the second individual could, by virtue of the
automobile patent, make and sell automobiles with four wheels without permission from
the owner of the wheel patent, the patent on the wheel would be meaningless.
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constitute “practicing” (and whether that includes outer space)
have largely been addressed, and are discussed in Part II. That
leaves, however, issues concerning what constitutes an “invention”
(and whether to consider activities in outer space in resolving
them)—these are addressed in Part III.
II.

SOLVED PROBLEMS IN EXTRATERRESTRIAL LAW

General legal implications of space flight and
extraterrestrial exploration and exploitation have been wellstudied and the “big” questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction have
been addressed.73 In addition, several patent issues have been
identified and resolved, either by domestic statute or by treaty74:
(1) which nation’s patent law applies to activities in space; (2)
which activities in space qualify as “domestic” for purposes of
priority; and (3) what qualifies as infringing activity.
In 1990, Congress provided by statute that, in general,
inventions made, used, or sold in outer space on a spacecraft
under the jurisdiction of the United States are treated as if within
the United States,75 and are also treated as if within the United
States if covered by international agreement.76 In effect, the
statute equates space objects under U.S. jurisdiction with other
territories and possessions under the jurisdiction of the United
States. While broad for the time, this statute still leaves
73 The Russian launch of Sputnik in 1957 triggered a spate of articles
considering questions of ownership and sovereignty in outer space. See, e.g., John C.
Cooper, The Russian Satellite—Legal and Political Problems, 24 J. AIR L. & COMM. 379,
379–83 (1957); D. Broward Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. AIR L. &
COMM. 384, 384–90 (1957); Eugène Pépin, Legal Problems Created by the Sputnik, 4
MCGILL L. J. 66, 67–69 (1957). Most of these questions were subsequently resolved, at
least by countries having the capability of space travel, by treaty.
74 See infra notes 75–80. There is one major space treaty that the United States has
not acceded to: The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 22 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. Article 11
of that agreement states that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind,” therefore “[t]he moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means” and “[n]either the surface
nor the subsurface of the moon, . . . or natural resources in place, shall become property of any
State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added);
see also Status of Treaties ch. XXIV Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 4,
2019), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV2&chapter=24&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/FW5F-LJUQ].
75 Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-580, 104 Stat. 2864, 2863 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 105 (2012)) (“Any invention made, used, or sold in outer space
on a space object or component thereof under the jurisdiction or control of the United
States shall be considered to be made, used or sold within the United States . . . .”).
76 Id. (“Any invention made, used, or sold in outer space on a space object or
component thereof that is carried on the registry of a foreign state . . . shall be considered
to be made, used or sold within the United States . . . if specifically, so agreed in an
international agreement between the United States and the state of registry.”).
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unresolved the status of extraterrestrial inventions (and prior art)
in general—only spacecraft under U.S. jurisdiction are covered.
Additionally, in 1994, the United States acceded to the
1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, which provides that “patents shall be available
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the
place of invention.”77 Then, in 1998, the United States acceded to
the 1998 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the
International Space Station, which provides that “each Partner
shall retain jurisdiction and control over the elements it
registers . . . and over personnel in or on the Space Station who
are its nationals” and recognizes the jurisdiction of the partner’s
courts and application of national laws regarding criminal
matters, civil liability, and protection of intellectual property
rights.78 Finally, in 2011, the America Invents Act79 eliminated
nationality requirements for non-published prior art. In doing
so, it may have raised more questions than it answered
regarding extraterrestrial aspects of U.S. patent law.80
Thus, a framework for dealing with intellectual property in
space has been established, at least as far as questions of
jurisdiction and the scope of enforcement of domestic patent rights.
Questions remain, however, and the most significant of them
relate, not to enforcement of existing rights, but rather to
acquisition of new rights.
III.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS: TWO PARADIGMATIC POLICY
PROBLEMS

One aspect of patent law that has remained unexplored
is the impact of extraterrestrial occurrences81 on patentability of
earth-borne inventions. The impact might be felt in one of two
ways, both resulting from the patent law requirement that, to be
patentable, an invention must be new82 and non-obvious.83
77 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
78 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, arts. 5, 16, 21–22, Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S No. 12,927.
79 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended at various sections of 35 U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter “AIA”].
80 See infra Part III.
81 Occurrences, such as publications, public use, and public dissemination of
knowledge which may be used to evaluate the novelty of a claimed invention are referred
to as “prior art.” As discussed in Section IV.A.1 infra, there are certain categories of prior
art which were not available to the public prior to the invention of, or application for a
patent on, the claimed invention. This has consequences, discussed in Parts IV and V, infra.
82 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012).
83 Id. § 103.
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In one scenario, a terrestrial inventor might make an
invention, never before seen on Earth, that is subsequently
discovered on another planet. Conventional patent law denies
patents to anything “naturally” occurring or previously known
by others. Should the terrestrial inventor be denied a patent? On
the one hand, the subsequent discovery takes nothing away from
the effort, ingenuity, and benefits to progress afforded by the
earth-borne invention. On the other hand, the invention is not
technically new—it already existed.
In a second scenario, a terrestrial inventor might make an
invention, never before seen on Earth, but previously invented and
known by an alien civilization and (accepting the possibility of
future alien contact) subsequently introduced to Earth by that
alien civilization. On the one hand, the subsequent introduction
takes nothing away from the effort, ingenuity, and benefits to
progress afforded by the earth-borne invention. On the other hand,
the terrestrial inventor is not technically the “first inventor” under
the America Invents Act (AIA).84
A simple example will illustrate the policy problem that
space exploration and exploitation poses for patent law. Assume
that there is a compound that does not exist naturally on Earth,
but does exist naturally somewhere in the universe.85 Then
imagine that a U.S. inventor, after years of research and millions
of dollars in cost, develops this same compound on Earth,
unaware that it already exists in space. The compound is useful
and non-obvious, and the inventor obtains a U.S. patent. This
patent gives the inventor the right to stop others from making,
using, or selling the compound in the United States and to stop
others from importing the compound into the United States.
Subsequently, a space exploration company (after years of
research and millions of dollars in cost) discovers the same

84 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3, 125 Stat.
285–93 (2011). For a discussion of the concepts and implications of “inventorship” under
“first inventor” and “first filer” systems, see Oppenheimer, Harmonization, supra note
23, at 448–54 (2007).
85 This is a reasonable assumption given the vastly different natural conditions
in space, for example near-vacuum and near absolute zero temperatures in space,
thermonuclear temperatures on stars and almost infinite gravity in black holes. If,
however, the assumption is incorrect, then the problem disappears and the solution is
simple: if there is no prior art in space, then the current statute’s “worldwide” coverage
is in effect “universal” coverage and no changes are required. See MIRIA M. FINCKENOR
& KIM K. DE GROH, NAT’L AUERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., A RESEARCHER’S GUIDE TO:
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: SPACE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 10–16 (2015),
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NP-2015-03-015-JSC_Space_EnvironmentISS-Mini-Book-2015-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK93-2Y56]; Space Environments and
Effects Program, NASA https://see.msfc.nasa.gov [https://perma.cc/QRP8-QYBB].
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compound on an asteroid and begins mining it.86 So far, there is
no problem under patent law. The inventor can prevent others
from making the compound in the United States, but the
exploration company is not making the compound (and certainly
not in the United States). The inventor can stop others from using
the compound, but only in the United States. The inventor can
stop others from selling the compound in the United States—but
so far, no sale has yet taken place (and certainly not in the U.S.).
The inventor can stop others from importing the compound into
the United States, but so far, the compound is still on the asteroid.
A conflict will arise, though, if the exploration company
tries to import the compound into the United States since
importation is one of the exclusive rights of the patent owner.87
How, then, should ownership of the invention be determined? The
options are to: (1) award ownership to the terrestrial inventor, who
has provided the valuable technology to the public before it was
discovered elsewhere; (2) award ownership to the extraterrestrial
discoverer as an incentive to make the huge expenditures and take
the huge risks involved in space exploration; or (3) award it to
neither and have the result dictated by the literal language of the
current statute and judicial interpretation.
A second set of issues arises by virtue of improved remote
sensing technology.88 It is now possible to detect and, to some
extent, characterize objects at distances so great that current
technology holds no prospect of actually reaching those objects.89
For example, spectral analysis of the light from distant stars can

86 Although extremely scarce and parceled out for research by the microgram,
samples have already been brought back by space missions—samples which may carry
material that, while naturally occurring in space, only exists on Earth if artificially created.
Meteorites pose the same issues but are random visitors and are therefore unlikely to present
the type of economic incentive that would bring these issues to the fore. See Rob Davies,
Asteroid Mining Could Be Space’s New Frontier: The Problem Is Doing It Legally, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 6, 2016 11:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/06/asteroidmining-space-minerals-legal-issues [https://perma.cc/D7NK-3AQH]. See generally Why
Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/why-asteroids/
[https://perma.cc/RJJ9-557P] (discussing a private company’s focus on developing deep space
exploration capabilities by mining water from asteroids); DEEP SPACE INDUSTRIES, http://deep
spaceindustries.com [https://perma.cc/99CF-E6WW] (discussing a private company’s
“ambitious venture to mine the resources of asteroids”).
87 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). It would also be an infringement of the inventor’s patent
to sell the compound in the U.S., but that would require prior importation from the asteroid.
88 See John F. Mustard & Jessica M. Sunshine, Spectral Analysis for Earth
Science: Investigations Using Remote Sensing Data, in REMOTE SENSING FOR THE EARTH
SCIENCES: MANUAL OF REMOTE SENSING 251, 251 (Andrew N. Rencz ed., 6th ed.,
1999), http://www.geo.brown.edu/research/Milliken/GEOL1710_files/Mustard_Manual
OfRemoteSensing_Ch5.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M8L-AEBP]; Remote Sensors, NASA:
EARTHDATA (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:34AM EDT) https://earthdata.nasa.gov/userresources/remote-sensors [https://perma.cc/7PRL-KX6V].
89 See Remote Sensors, supra note 88.
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identify elements which are present on those stars.90 If the
spectral analysis of a star reveals that there are spectral lines
not previously observed (and therefore indicating the presence
of a previously unknown element), should this constitute prior
art which would deny a patent to an earthbound inventor who
subsequently synthesizes that element on Earth?
Once again, one option is to award a patent to the
terrestrial inventor, who has provided the public with actual access
to an element which, while theoretically identified in outer space,
was in no way accessible to the public prior to the terrestrial
inventor’s efforts. The other option is to hold the newly identified
element unpatentable91—the result dictated by the literal language
of the current statute and judicial interpretation.
Ordinarily, analysis of a development not anticipated by the
Founders would begin with the language of the Constitution as
adopted, any prior versions of the language, and the insight that
contemporary discussion might offer. In the case of patent rights, the
analysis is brief: “No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has
left any record concerning the interpretation or meaning placed on
the intellectual property clause by the delegates themselves.”92
A.

Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Is Nature Universal?

If an earthbound inventor creates something that does not
exist naturally on Earth, it is potentially patentable.93 If it does
exist naturally on Earth but that fact is unknown when the
USPTO reviews the patent application, a patent will be granted.
But if it is subsequently discovered in nature, the hypothetical
patent will be held invalid.94 Should the same result apply if the

See id.
The person who deduced the existence of the element by observing the
spectral lines would not be able to get a patent because the observation and deduction
do not teach how to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also infra
Section II.D. The person who synthesized the element on earth would not be able to get
a patent because the element was already known under a literal reading of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (2012). See discussion supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
92 Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995). For a summary of
available research and thinking on the genesis of the IP clause, see Max Stul
Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 269, 273–81 (2010).
93 Invention itself, of course, is not enough for patentability: the other
requirements, discussed in Part I, supra, must be met.
94 Patents are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). That presumption may,
however, be overcome by showing that the decision to issue the patent was flawed, for
example, because there was prior art that the USPTO had not considered before issuing the
patent. Canron, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 609 F.2d 1075, 1075 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
90
91
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invention does not, in fact, exist naturally on Earth but does exist
elsewhere in the universe?
The answer turns on interpretation of Section 101. That
section of the patent statute has been described as a gatekeeper,95
defining the only categories of invention which are eligible for
patent consideration: “new and useful process[es], machine[s],
manufacture[s], or compositions of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.”96 The Supreme Court, however, has
engrafted three exceptions to the categories enumerated as
patentable: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”97 The Court further explained that “[t]he concepts covered
by these exceptions are ‘part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”98
A literal reading of Supreme Court precedent might lead to
the conclusion that the hypothetical patent should be invalidated.
The cases place no geographic limits on the location in which the
laws of nature apply, or the physical phenomena exist. To date,
however, the Court has only had to deal with earthly inventions,
laws of nature, and physical phenomena. Should the Court’s
language extend to either: (1) inventions made in space; (2) laws of
nature which do not apply on Earth but do apply in space;99 or (3)
95 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that
§ 101 is a threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability);
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The first door which must be opened on
the difficult path to patentability is § 101.”). This view, however, finds no support in the
patent statute and is contrary to the stated practice of the USPTO. Patent examiners
are instructed that their review of a patent application is to be “complete as to all
matters.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (2018); see also MPEP § 707.07(g) (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan.
2018) (“[p]iecemeal examination should be avoided as much as possible.”).
96 35 U. S. C. § 101 (2012).
97 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
98 Id. at 602 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo lnoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948)).
99 It was once an article of scientific faith that the universe is governed by a
single set of laws of physics which apply everywhere. See, e.g., Neil deGrasse Tyson, On
Earth as in the Heavens, NAT. HIST. MAG., Nov. 2000, at 90–92 (“The universality of
physical laws drives scientific discovery like nothing else.”); Neil de Grasse Tyson,
Telling the Story, NAT. HIST. MAG., Feb. 2000, at 48 (“All parts of the known universe
reflect the same basic laws of nature we observe and test here on Earth.”). Some now
question that assumption. See Swinburne Univ. of Tech., Laws of Physics Vary
Throughout the Universe, New Study Suggests, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 9, 2010)
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100909004112.htm [https://perma.cc/SF
42-LFTP] (According to Dr. Michael Murphy from Swinburne University, “It’s one of the
biggest questions of modern science—are the laws of physics the same everywhere in the
universe and throughout its entire history?” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dr.
Murphy is one of the authors of a 2011 article which reported detecting minute variations
in what were thought to be cosmological constants, raising the possibility that the laws
of physics are not constant throughout the universe. J. K. Webb et al., Indications of a
Spatial Variation of the Fine Structure Constant, 107 PHYS. REV. LETT. 191101 (2011). If
that is the case, then extraterrestrial discoveries would not necessarily constitute prior
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physical phenomena (including “natural” compounds) which are
natural in space, but not on Earth? Would the rationale that these
are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men” apply even
though very few have access to them?100 Any of these issues would
be questions of first impression.
There is, however, a clue in the issuance of U.S. Patent
3,161,462.101 That patent, which claimed a new transuranium
compound, “Element 96 and compositions thereof,” was issued
to Glen T. Seaborg, assignor to the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission in 1964.102 While Dr. Seaborg was the first person
to isolate Element 96 (curium) on Earth, the element clearly
exists in other parts of the universe103 (and, in fact, exists on
Earth in minute quantities).104 The fact that the patent office
issued the patent suggests that isolation of a natural element,
although technically a physical phenomenon (and therefore
unpatentable under the literal reading of the Supreme Court’s
language), might still be patentable if the newly isolated
element were not otherwise obtainable on Earth.105 The Seaborg
patent was never challenged in court, so there is no definitive
judicial guidance on the issue. In the absence of judicial
guidance, the views (and actions in determining to issue the
patent) of the USPTO would be illuminating. It is possible that
the USPTO raised objections to the application since the
application was pending before the USPTO for fifteen years.106 It

art, as they would exist under different conditions than those on Earth. However, even
assuming that physical laws are, in fact, universal, there are still certainly
manifestations of those laws which do not exist on Earth but do exist in space. An
example would be a black hole.
100 Of course, if space travel becomes commonplace, the analysis would need to change.
101 U.S. Patent No. 3,161,462 (filed Feb. 7, 1949) (issued Dec. 15, 1964).
102 Id.
103 It was speculated that curium was produced in stars, and its natural existence
in other parts of the universe was confirmed when it was detected in a meteorite. Francois
L.H. Tissot, Nicholas Dauphas, & Lawrence Grossman, Origin of Uranium Isotope
Variations in Early Solar Nebula Condensates, 2 SCI. ADVANCES *1, *2 (2016).
104 It is thought that “[m]inute amounts [of curium] may exist in natural
deposits of uranium.” Periodic Table: Curium, ROYAL SOC’Y OF CHEMISTRY,
http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/96/curium [https://perma.cc/USX8-JJD4].
105 The process of isolating curium for the first time on Earth was
extraordinary. It began by placing 100 mg. of plutonium, itself extraordinarily hard to
come by at the time, in a cyclotron (a rare scientific tool at the time) and bombarding it
with helium ions, dissolving it in sulfuric acid, evaporating the sulfuric acid solution,
then dissolving what remained in dilute nitric acid. What had not dissolved in the dilute
nitric acid was then dissolved by heating with a nitric acid/hydrofluoric acid mixture and
oxidized. Finally, lanthanum fluoride was precipitated from the solution carrying with
it insoluble curium trifluoride, from which curium was isolated. See ‘462 Patent.
106 Currently, the average time to disposition—the time from filing a patent
application until it is either issued or abandoned—is roughly two years. See U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2018).
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was filed February 7, 1949 and issued December 15, 1964.107
Such USPTO objections would be reflected in the application file,
which is a public document,108 yet the file for this application is
“missing.”109 Therefore, all that can be said for certain is that the
courts have not addressed the issue and, if the USPTO had
concerns about patentability under such circumstances, those
concerns were overcome and the patent was issued.110
B.

Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 102: Is Novelty Restricted to
Earth?

There has been an evolution in the view of what constitutes
prior art, beginning with what might be termed “insular prior art”
(limited to materials that are actually available to the public within
the jurisdiction),111 evolving to what might be termed “feasibly
available prior art” (consisting of materials that are actually
available to the public within the jurisdiction plus materials that
have a high probability of becoming available to that public),112 and

‘462 Patent.
37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (2018); see also MPEP § 103 (9th ed. Rev. 7., Jan. 2018).
109 Correspondence on file with the author.
110 In a similar case, dealing with claims to the invention of Element 95
(Americium), the USPTO had rejected claims to the element, because in its view the
same element would have been produced—although not recognized—by earlier
experiments using a Fermi reactor. In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964). In
that case, the court reversed the rejection, concluding that there was “no positive
evidence that americium was produced . . . by the operation of the [Fermi] reactor” in
light of an affidavit that concluded that the earlier production of Americium by a Fermi
reactor was purely theoretical, and that the theoretical calculations showed that
107
108

the maximum amount of americium-241 that could have been produced in the
reactor . . . can be calculated to be 6.15 × 10-9 gram. Thus, the reactor could
have produced no more than one billionth of a gram of americium-241, and this
one billionth of a gram would have been distributed throughout forty tons of
intensely radioactive uranium reactor fuel. This amount of an unknown,
unconcentrated isotope, if present, would have been undetectable.
Id. at 997. Because the decision rested on a failure of proof, it did not resolve the issue
of patentability of a newly isolated element. It is possible, though, that this case, decided
in March of 1964, may have persuaded the USPTO to abandon any challenge to the
claims to Element 96 and issue the patent—after fifteen years of review—in December
1964. See ‘462 Patent. While the file itself is missing, the typical time taken to complete
the mechanical step of issuing the patent once the decision has been made that the
invention is patentable and the applicant has paid the issue fee is about two months,
which suggests that the USPTO’s decision that the invention was patentable must have
occurred very shortly after the decision in In re Seaborg.
111 The Venetian and early British systems of patents of importation are
examples. See infra Section IV.A.4.
112 The U.S. system from 1836 to 2012 is an example. During that period, prior
art consisted of things known or used in the U.S. plus printed publications anywhere.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (pre-AIA). An explanation of this distinction is provided in
In re Tenney: A printed publication is more likely to become available to the public than
is personal knowledge held abroad. Printing implies a number of copies, and books travel
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culminating in what might be termed “unrestricted prior art”
(consisting of materials known or used anywhere).113
When Congress overhauled the patent statute in 1952, the
committee reports from both chambers stated that patentable
subject matter was intended to “include anything under the sun
that is made by man.”114 The related questions of whether prior
art as well encompassed everything under the sun and whether
“under the sun” meant “on Earth” were not considered by the prespace age Congress. Therefore, the novelty requirement, set out
in Section 102, was written in terms of activities in this country,
and activities in this or a foreign country, without mention of
activities beyond Earth.
The 1952 version of Section 102 set out the requirement
(which remained in force until the America Invents Act115 was
enacted in 2011) that, to be patentable, an invention must be novel116
Thus, under the 1952 patent statute, a patent application
would be rejected as anticipated if the claimed invention had been
disclosed in a prior publication anywhere, but in order to reject it
based on unpublished knowledge, use or offer for sale, such activity
would have had to have taken place within the United States.
1. Impact of AIA amendments
The post-space age amendments to the patent statute
enacted in the America Invents Act eliminated these geographic
distinctions.117 The language chosen, however, was not written
with the possibility of extraterritorial prior art in mind, and
therefore raise (probably inadvertently) the first novelty issue
posed by extraterrestrial activity.
As amended by the AIA, Section 102 now provides (with
exceptions related to publications by, or derived from, the
patent applicant):

across national boundaries more easily than people do. See In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619,
625–26 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
113 The current, post-AIA U. S. system is an example. Prior art consists of things
published, known or used or “otherwise available to the public”, without reference to
geography. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
114 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The
language from the committee reports was quoted as support for the holding in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty that genetically engineered organisms were, although alive, patentable.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
115 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
116 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (pre-AIA). If a prior art reference
discloses what is claimed in a patent claim, the reference makes the claim unpatentable
because the claim does not cover a novel invention and is said to “anticipate” the claim.
See supra note 49–53 and accompanying text.
117 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
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(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.118

Eliminating the “in this country” language from the statute has
the consequence of broadening the scope of prior art considered
in evaluating the novelty, and therefore patentability, of a
claimed invention. The question that remains is whether the
language change was intended to remove all spatial limitations
on the location of prior art (and therefore include
extraterrestrial prior art) or simply to remove the distinction
between domestic and foreign (earthly) prior art.119 It is certainly
possible that, by removing not only the language “in this
country” but also the language “in this or a foreign country” the
intent was to remove location as a factor in enumerating prior
art—i.e., anything in the universe could qualify. If this was the
intent, the new language introduces a new ambiguity: the
meaning of “public.” It is hard to support the argument that the
twelve people who have walked on the moon120 constitute “the
public.”121 Thus, if a lunar astronaut had observed something on
the moon and had written a publication describing it or filed a
patent application based on it, it would clearly constitute prior
art under Section 102(a);122 the observation itself would not
(unless “public” is read to cover such a small and constrained
group) constitute prior art.123

118 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). The statute also permits certain patent
applications to be considered prior art that can invalidate claims even though the
applications were not available to the public at the time the claims were filed. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(2) (2012). This provision was not changed by the AIA amendments.
119 The question is not addressed in the legislative history.
120 For a list of people who have walked on the moon, see Atkinson, supra note 5.
121 Some support for the proposition might be found in the treatment of
classified information as prior art. While it is not considered a publication until it is
declassified, once declassified it may be used as evidence of prior knowledge as of the
date of its (classified) dissemination. MPEP 707.05(f) (8th ed. Rev. 9., Aug. 2012). There
is still an issue whether the classified dissemination was sufficiently broad to constitute
“public” knowledge, but the fact that it was not available to the “general public” does not
disqualify it. Of course, it cannot be prior art at all until it is declassified, because until
then neither the USPTO nor a potential infringement defendant would have access to it.
122 Information which is disseminated to a small group under an obligation of
confidentiality is not prior art. MPEP 2128.01(III). However, published information is
clearly covered by Section 102(a).
123 This interpretation would also help explain the decision to issue the Seaborg
patent: even accepting that curium existed naturally in “minute quantities” or was
unintentionally created in earlier nuclear experiments, the number of people who would
have had access to it was small and selected (and under obligations of confidentiality).
See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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2. Application of the “Inherency” Doctrine
A second novelty-related problem implicates the doctrine
of “inherency.” The inherency doctrine is described by the
USPTO as follows:
The express, implicit, and inherent disclosures of a prior art reference
may be relied upon in the rejection of claims . . . . The discovery of a
previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition, or of a
scientific explanation for the prior art’s functioning, does not render
the old composition patentably new to the discoverer . . . . [and] just
as the discovery of properties of a known material does not make it
novel, the identification and characterization of a prior art material
also does not make it novel.124

The policy behind the inherency doctrine is that, if the public
already has access to the technology, there is no need to
purchase it with a patent monopoly—even if the public does not
know that it has access to the technology. The policy is
constitutionally required: Congress cannot remove information
from the public domain because removal would thwart the
constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts.125
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in EMI v. Cypress Semiconductor offers this illustration of the policy:
A hypothetical example clarifies this principle. Humans lit fires for
thousands of years before realizing that oxygen is necessary to create
and maintain a flame. The first person to discover the necessity of
oxygen certainly could not have obtained a valid patent claim for “a
method of making a fire by lighting a flame in the presence of oxygen.”
Even if prior art on lighting fires did not disclose the importance of
oxygen and one of ordinary skill in the art did not know about the
importance of oxygen, understanding this law of nature would not give
the discoverer a right to exclude others from practicing the prior art
of making fires.126

Thus, a prior art reference may anticipate a claim even if it does
not explicitly disclose every feature of the claimed invention if each
“missing [feature] is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single
anticipating reference.”127 In that case, the public had access to the
124 MPEP § 2112 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Jan. 2018) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). A single prior art reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently,
each limitation of a claim invalidates that claim by anticipation. Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
125 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146, 150 (1989).
126 See EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
127 See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2003); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,
379 (2005) (Where courts “actually find inherent anticipation . . . . the determining factor
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inherent feature—even if the public was not specifically aware that
the feature was present. Similarly, “[n]ewly discovered results of
known processes” are “not patentable”—those results are inherent
in the known processes.128
In other words, contrary to the intuitive meaning of
“prior” art, there are certain “later” activities that are still
considered “prior” art.129 An example is presented in the Myriad
case.130 In that case, the patent applicant had discovered a gene
sequence that had significant therapeutic value. Prior to the
discovery by the applicant (and recognition of the significance of
the gene sequence), no human knew of its existence or function.
Prior to the discovery by the applicant, however, the gene
sequence (obviously) existed. The Court held the discovery
unpatentable as a mere discovery of a natural substance.131
Thus, it was the applicant’s own discovery that defeated the
patent—but for that discovery, no one would have known that
the gene sequence existed (and therefore constituted prior art,
which denied the applicant’s right to the patent).
In another example, In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation,
researchers at Johns Hopkins had determined that, at an early
stage of development, broccoli sprouts were high in a compound
that had cancer-fighting properties, and claimed “a method of
preparing food products rich in glucosinolates . . . [by] harvesting
sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage, to form a food product comprising

appears to be that the public has already benefitted from the presence of the claimed
invention in the prior art, even though it may not have been aware of the invention itself.”).
128 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
129 Patents are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). That presumption
may, however, be overcome by showing that the patent should not have been issued, for
example because there was prior art that the USPTO had not considered during the
prosecution of the patent, i.e., later discovered prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012). It
is also possible for information that was unknown to the public at the time of the
invention may still constitute “prior” art. For example, classified material is considered
published when declassified, but may be considered “known” at an earlier date. See supra
note 121. Thus, there might be information to which the general public gained access
only after the invention was made (or after a patent application is filed), but which might
be treated as prior art because of developments subsequent to the invention (and possibly
even subsequent to the filing of the patent application). Interestingly, this logic is not
applied to the seemingly similar situation of magazine articles. As to those, the USPTO
takes the position that the effective date of a magazine is the date it reaches an
addressee, not the date it is mailed. MPEP § 2128.08 (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018). This
position is supported by caselaw. See Canron, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 609 F.2d 1075,
1075 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 599 F.2d 62, 64–
65 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Neither the USPTO nor the cases have taken the second
step of acknowledging that by the time a magazine is placed in the mail, its contents
must be “known by others” (the authors, editors, production staff, etc.).
130 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
131 Id. at 591, 596.
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a plurality of sprouts.”132 No one else had recognized the high
concentrations of glucosinolates in sprouts at this early stage, but
the court held the claims invalid because the inventors merely
discovered an inherent, although previously unappreciated,
property of the sprouts.133
In the USPTO’s view, “[t]here is no requirement that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the
inherent disclosure at the time of invention, but only that the
subject matter is in fact inherent in the prior art reference.”134
C.

Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 103: What Is the Person of
Ordinary Skill Presumed to Know?

In addition to requiring novelty, the patent statute requires
that, in order to be patentable, the claimed invention must not be
obvious to people of ordinary skill in the relevant art.135
The underlying reason for denying patents based on
obviousness is to limit the grant of patent monopolies to
situations in which the public receives in exchange technology
which it would not otherwise receive,136 and inventions which are

See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1350–52.
134 MPEP § 2112 (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Schering Corp. owned a patent (4,282,233)
covering loratadine, the active component of Claritin, a blockbuster antihistamine
marketed by Schering, and a method of using the compound to treat allergies. Id. at
1374–75. When the patent was about to expire, Schering applied for a patent covering
descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), the compound created in a user’s body when loratadine
is metabolized. Id. at 1375. The court held that, although DCL was unknown until
disclosed in the new patent, the method of treatment disclosed in the original patent
necessarily produced DCL when a patient took Claritin and therefore the 4,282,233
patents anticipated the later application. Id. at 1380–81. The court rejected the
contention that inherent anticipation requires that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have recognized the existence of the inherent property. Id. at 1377. There is at
least one case holding, to the contrary, that not only must the missing element be
inherently present, but in addition it must have been recognizable by a person of
ordinary skill. See Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). These positions seem inconsistent. The Federal Circuit has stated, however,
“[o]ur cases have consistently held that a reference may anticipate even when the
relevant properties of the thing disclosed were not appreciated at the time.” Abbott Labs.
v. Baxter Pharm. Prods. Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For detailed analysis
and attempts to rationalize the positions, see Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum,
Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1102–03,
1106–07, 1116–17, 1150 (2008). See generally Cynthia Chen, Note, Schering Corp. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarification of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and Its
Implications, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95 (2005).
135 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
136 The obviousness standard was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 103 in 1952, but the
principle that inventions which were technically new, but encompassed only minor
variations on known technology was recognized judicially as an extension of the
132
133
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obvious variations of what already is available would, in the
ordinary course, become available as well. This goal justifies the
judicially created fiction that the hypothetical person of ordinary
skill knows everything that is available to the public. In In re
Winslow, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (predecessor
of the Federal Circuit) held that the obviousness of a claimed
invention was to be determined with reference to a hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the field who was presumed to have
complete knowledge of all relevant prior art.137
The goal of denying patents for ideas that would likely
become available to the public without intervening invention
justifies the fiction that the hypothetical person of ordinary skill
knows everything that is available to the public. The question
remains: how far should the fiction extend? The notion of
ignoring the cost of assembling the knowledge appears implicit
in the Winslow rationale, so that the knowledge available to the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill should include knowledge
brought back to Earth from space, even at great cost.
The harder question is whether the fiction should extend to
every natural phenomenon, whether previously observed or not, and
whether existing on Earth or not, or should it only apply to natural
phenomena that had been reported back to the hypothetical
earthbound person of ordinary skill? This question implicates the
inherency doctrine discussed above,138 but with a complication. The
application of the doctrine of inherency in a determination of
obviousness is more complicated than in a determination of novelty
because “[t]hat which may be inherent is not necessarily known and
that which is unknown cannot be obvious.”139 Inherency can defeat
novelty because what is claimed is not really new—it was just not
recognized. Obviousness, however, requires a determination that
someone of ordinary skill would likely have been able to achieve the
claimed invention knowing all that was known. If an inherent
property was not previously known, it would not have been available
to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill to use in achieving the
claimed invention.
An even harder extension of the Winslow fiction to justify
would be knowledge of as-yet unappreciated properties of things
that exist in the universe but not as yet on Earth. Such an
extension would appear to require that the hypothetical person of
statutory novelty standard in 1850 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 265–67 (1850).
137 In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
138 See supra Section III.B.2.
139 See Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A. DE C.V., 865 F.3d
1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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ordinary skill, in addition to having complete knowledge of
everything known about the field, including as-yet unappreciated
properties of known materials, can also predict the future and
foresee information that exists in the universe but has not yet
been introduced to the earthbound “public.”
D.

Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 112: Enablement and Claiming

Section 112 of the patent statute requires that an
applicant for a patent describe how to make and use the claimed
invention140 (the “enablement” requirement) and provide claims
which define the invention141 (the “claiming” requirement).142 Both
requirements are typically met with earthbound applications in
mind.143 The two requirements are related. The degree of
enablement required (and the scope of available prior art) is
defined by the scope of the claims. The applicant need only enable
what is claimed, and only material which is relevant to the claims
is relevant prior art.144 If the claims are not fully supported by the
enabling description, they are referred to as overbroad and will
not be allowed145; on the other hand, an applicant wants to claim
as much as possible and does not want the claims to fail to include
everything that has been enabled and is not precluded by prior
art. Therefore, both requirements will require reevaluation as
extraterrestrial activity becomes more common.
It would be unusual for a patent application to recite that
the invention is to be made or used “under standard conditions
on earth” in order to make the invention operative,146 because
most inventions are intended to be made and used on Earth147
and therefore those conditions are implicit. Conditions would not
normally be recited unless non-standard conditions were
required to describe how the invention would be made or used.
In addition, it would be unusual to need to recite “standard”
conditions in order to distinguish the claimed invention from

35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Id. § 112(b).
142 Id. § 112(a)–(b) (2012).
143 There are exceptions, typically patents directed to inventions intended to be
used in space. See, e.g., U. S. Patent No. 4,815,279 (filed Apr. 13, 1987) (issued Mar. 28,
1989) (issued to Franklin R. Chang for “Hybrid plume plasma rocket”). Claim 1 is
illustrative: “A space vehicle having a selectable vehicle velocity and a selectively
adjustable thrust . . . .” Id. col. 6.
144 See supra Section III.B.2.
145 MPEP § 706.03(c) (9th ed., Rev. 8 Jan. 2018).
146 35 U.S.C. § 112.
147 In addition, if the invention happened to work in some extraterrestrial
environments, it would inherently satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
140
141
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prior art: most prior art is earthbound and therefore also
operates under “standard” conditions.148
As extraterrestrial activity increases, however, the
conditions under which an invention is intended to operate will
become relevant. If an invention requires oxygen to operate,
enablement for earthbound operations would not require explicitly
stating so, while enablement for operation in space would require
an explanation of how the required oxygen will be supplied.
Related to the question of whether it is necessary to be
explicit regarding conditions which are implicit on Earth is the
question of whether it is necessary to be explicit in defining the
scope of the invention. As discussed above, claims in a patent
application are rejected under Section 102 if they have already
been disclosed in the prior art or under Section 103 if they have not
been disclosed in the prior art, but would have been obvious given
what is in the prior art.149 If a claim is specifically limited to
particular conditions, then it cannot be rejected unless the prior art
discloses, or renders obvious, those conditions. Careful applicants
may therefore begin drafting claims to inventions which are
intended to operate on Earth to include explicit terms that limit
the operation and definition of the invention to earthly conditions.
In addition to satisfying enablement requirements, this will also
have the effect of reducing the scope of extraterrestrial prior art
that might otherwise be used to reject claims.
IV.

DESIGNING A SOLUTION

A comprehensive approach to the application of patent
law to extraterrestrial activity is currently missing two
elements. It should include rules governing the protection of
extraterrestrial innovation: and should address the questions of
whether new compounds discovered in space and new
technologies invented in space should be protectable under U.S.
patent law and, if so whether they should be protectable even if
they represent “principles of nature” in the location where
discovered or invented, but not on Earth. It should also include
rules governing the use of extraterrestrial discoveries to deny
patents for innovations made on Earth: if an invention is made
on Earth (meaning that human intervention was required in
order to make it possible) but the same “invention” occurs
148 If there were extraterrestrial prior art that needed to be distinguished, the
applicant would have the option of limiting the claims either spatially (to Earth) or of
specifying conditions that exist on Earth but not at the location where the
extraterrestrial prior art was found.
149 See supra Section III.B–C.

936

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:3

naturally in some extraterrestrial environment, should that
deny the earthbound inventor of a patent? If so, should it matter
whether the extraterrestrial phenomenon was unknown at the
time the earthbound inventions was made?
Any solution must either be consistent with the Constitution
and treaties, or must be sufficiently compelling to justify changing
them. The solution must, of course, also be consistent with federal
law, but presumably the selected solution will either be lawful or
sufficiently compelling to persuade Congress to adopt the necessary
legislation, and “the powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject
of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there
are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their
right to modify them at their pleasure.”150
There is, surprisingly, a question as to whether the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, or whether treaties
are co-equal with the Constitution. The Constitution grants the
president the power “by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur”151 and also provides that “[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.”152
As Professor Tribe notes, a treaty “may effectively repeal
preceding congressional legislation and preempt conflicting state
law,”153 but this leaves open the question whether a treaty can
override the Constitution. In 1870, the Supreme Court held that
“a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be
in violation of that instrument.”154 In 1957, the Court held an
executive agreement, which gave U.S. military courts exclusive
jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen and their families stationed in
Great Britain, unconstitutional.155
The uncertainty regarding the hierarchy of treaties and
the Constitution arise because, as Nowak and Rotunda observe:
“Justice Holmes suggested once . . . that treaties were equal to
the Constitution, even if they were not made in pursuance of it.
As a consequence, the theory developed that treaties were not

See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
152 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
153 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 645 (3d ed. 2000).
154 The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620–21 (1870).
155 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5, 15–19, 40–41 (1957) (holding that the executive
agreement violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
150
151
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subject to any constitutional limitations.”156 Nowak and Rotunda
go on, however, to conclude “[t]his view is incorrect. As Justice
Field stated, in often quoted dictum in De Geofroy v. Riggs, the
treaty power, like all other powers that the Constitution grants,
is subject to constitutional limitations.”157
The hierarchy of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties
continues to provide fuel for debate,158 and three commentators
have analyzed the possibility of using the Treaty Power to
overcome perceived constitutional problems in the specific context
of intellectual property rights.159 Since there appear to be no
conflicts between the Constitution and current treaties, however,
the analysis will proceed on the assumption that any solution
should be consistent with those treaties.160
The United States is a signatory to three major treaties
which could constrain extraterrestrial patent principles.161 The
first, the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),162 is not by its
terms directed to activities in space. It does not appear that the
negotiators were focused on questions of extraterrestrial activity,
but rather were attempting to harmonize patent laws among
nations. The treaty does, however, contain language which
appears broad enough to cover activities in space: “patents shall
be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination

156 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242 (6th ed.
2000) (footnote omitted) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
157 Id. (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1890).
158 See, e.g., Audrey I. Benison, International Criminal Tribunals: Is There a
Substantive Limitation on the Treaty Power?, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 75 (2001); David
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1077–79 (2000); Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United
States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2–4 (2004).
159 See Holbrook, supra note 158, at 4; Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive
Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the
Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1079–84 (2005); Oppenheimer, Harmonization,
supra note 23, at 483–87.
160 Of course, if a desired solution conflicted with a treaty, there would be the option
to withdraw from the treaty. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from
International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204 (2010). But see Lea Brilmayer & Isaias
Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and “Withdrawal” from Customary International
Law: An Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous Consequences, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 217
(2011), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/treaty-denunciation-and-qwithdrawalqfrom-customary-international-law-an-erroneous-analogy-with-dangerous-consequences
[https://perma.cc/5CRX-RGW5].
161 See Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, supra note 78; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 77; Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
162 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 77, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 299.
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as to the place of invention. . . . .”163 Arguably, by using the phrase
“place of invention” rather than, for example, “country of
invention,” the treaty applies to extraterrestrial activity.164
Assuming that the treaty does apply to extraterrestrial activity,
it would require granting patents on inventions without
discrimination simply because they were “invented” in space, but
would place no other constraints on the proposed solutions.165
The second major treaty that the United States is a
signatory to is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which prohibited colonization of
the moon and other celestial bodies “by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”166 Article VI
requires signatories to assure that activities by their nationals,
whether by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities are carried out in conformity with the treaty.167 Article VIII
provides that signatories retain jurisdiction over objects launched
into space including objects constructed on a celestial body.168
Article VII makes each signatory “internationally liable for damage
to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons.”169 Although there are no cases on patent infringement
under this treaty,170 these provisions read together appear to
authorize actions for infringement of patents in space on the same
basis as if the infringing activity had occurred within the
signatory’s territory on Earth.
The third major treaty signed by the United States is the
1998 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the International
Space Station, which provides that “each Partner shall retain
jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers . . . and
over personnel in or on the Space Station who are its nationals”
and recognizes the jurisdiction of the partner’s courts and

Id. at 311.
Id.
165 If the TRIPS treaty is determined not to apply to space, then it imposes no
constraints whatsoever on the solutions.
166 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 161, 18 U.S.T. 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. 208.
167 Id. at 18 U.S.T. 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. 209.
168 Id. at 18 U.S.T. 2416, 610 U.N.T.S. 209.
169 Id. at 18 U.S.T. 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. 209.
170 One case asserting private property rights to an extraterrestrial object was
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Nemitz v. United States, No. CVN030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) (alleging
trespass against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for landing on an
asteroid claimed by the plaintiff).
163
164
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application of national laws regarding criminal matters, civil
liability, and protection of intellectual property rights.171
One additional treaty should be mentioned, although the
United States has not acceded to it. The Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
states that “[t]he moon is not subject to national appropriation by
any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means” and “natural resources in place, shall [not] become
property of any State . . . non-governmental organization, . . . or
of any natural person.”172 The specific language (“natural
resources in place”) would not appear to implicate patent rights.
The more general language (appropriation . . . by any other
means), however, is arguably broad enough to cover patent rights
if a patent claim covered activity on the moon. As the United
States is not currently a signatory, this treaty is not considered
further in the analysis that follows.
Andrew Brehm analyzes the application of current
treaties to property rights in space and concludes that such
rights are not available to private parties.173 If that were
generally true, it would severely constrain the development of
intellectual property rights in space or arising from activities in
space. His analysis focuses, however, on tangible property, and
there are distinctions between tangible and intangible property
which might allow a contrary conclusion with respect to
intangible property rights, such as patents. Tangible property is
exclusive in the sense that possession by one individual
precludes simultaneous possession by anyone else; intangible
property is non-exclusive—more than one person can hold the
same trade secret, for example. As Thomas Jefferson observed,
the “peculiar character [of an idea] . . . is that no one possesses
the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who
receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine receives light
without darkening me.”174 In addition, tangible property is, by
171 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, supra note 78, at 5.
172 Moon Treaty, supra note 74, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
173 Andrew R. Brehm, Note, Private Property in Outer Space: Establishing a
Foundation for Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 359–62 (2015). Leslie Tennen
likewise argues that national recognition of private property rights in space “would
constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, and thereby constitute
a form of national appropriation” in violation of treaties, for example Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer
Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 805 (2010).
174 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 24. As I have
previously argued, “this observation was clearly a lapse of economic judgment for the
sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade secret law is that there is economic value in keeping
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definition, local—it exists at one particular place and, under
traditional rules, is subject to the jurisdiction of that place—
while intangible property has no physical location and therefore
may be subject to multiple, remote, jurisdictions.175
Moreover, unlike tangible property claims in outer space,
intangible property rights embodied in intellectual property could
have effect only within terrestrial territories (at least until a court
system is established in outer space). Claims would only be binding
on individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the nation which
granted those rights. This sort of jurisdiction is classically within
the power of nations176 and not inconsistent with treaty obligations
not to “claim” space.177 Therefore, if the treaty concerns relate to
the threat of occupation of space and national control of space,178
those concerns do not apply to intangible property and thus would
not be pose the types of legal concerns identified by Brehm.
In addition to satisfying any constraints imposed by treaty
obligations, any solution must, of course, also be consistent with
the Constitution. The principal constitutional constraint on patent
laws in general is found in Article I of the Constitution. Any patent
enactment must “promote the progress of [s]cience and useful
[a]rts.”179 To date, no provision of the current patent statute has
been found unconstitutional,180 so the extension of existing
provisions to space should pose no special constitutional issues.
competitors in the dark.” Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of
Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229, 236 n.20 (1999). The point regarding
the non-exclusivity of intangible property is, however, valid.
175 See, for example, 35 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012), which extends U.S. patent rights
to cover manufacture, use or sale “in outer space on a space object or component thereof
under the jurisdiction or control of the United States.”
176 In a sense, this is comparable to the patents of importation discussed infra Section
IV.A.4. Both can be viewed as rewarding the importation of technology from abroad by imposing
restrictions on the importing country’s citizens within the importing country’s borders.
177 See, e.g., Nemitz v. United States No. CV–N030599–HDM (RAM), 2004 WL
3167042, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), (in which the plaintiff had claimed an asteroid
on which a U. S. spacecraft had landed. The U.S. federal district court held that there
was no cognizable cause of action against the United States—and, of course, there was
no court on the asteroid in which the claim could be brought).
178 These do appear to be the principal concerns. For example, the Outer Space
Treaty states “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 161, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, see also KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 427 (2007).
180 The most recent provision of the patent statute to survive constitutional
challenge is the process known as “inter partes review” (introduced in the AIA) whereby
any member of the public may challenge an issued patent in an administrative
proceeding within the USPTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC
v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371, 1379 (2018). In addition, many
commentators questioned whether changing the “first inventor” provisions of the patent
statute to “first to file” provisions is constitutional. See, e.g., Michael A. Glenn & Peter
J. Nagle, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent Reform or Doublespeak?, 50
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One existing constitutional constraint with potential
application to options for dealing with extraterrestrial patent
rights is the principle that only one patent may be issued for any
invention.181 If two applicants claimed the same invention under
the pre-AIA statute, ownership was resolved through an
interference proceeding.182 Under the AIA, the interference
proceeding was considered unnecessary and was replaced by a
derivation proceeding to determine if the first applicant had
obtained knowledge of the invention from the “true” inventor.183
This “one invention/one patent” principle precludes solutions
which allow two inventors.
A.

Available Models

It is tempting to conclude that the impact of
extraterrestrial activity on patent law is sui generis and that no
precedent exists, leaving to Congress, writing on a blank slate,
the task of figuring out which rules should apply. Surprisingly,
however, these issues are not new. They were faced four hundred
years ago and, in the interim, patent theory has developed
different solutions to the tension between the desire to provide
an incentive to innovate and the desire to limit monopolization
of innovation. It turns out that, in addition to solutions that
approach this as a wholly new problem, there have been earlier
situations when new “worlds” opened up and they provide
models that could be useful for determining the impact of the
opening of this most recent “new world” on patent law.

IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 441, 457–61 (2010); Holdbrook, supra note 158, at 6; Brad
Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent
Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 762–63 (2006);
Karen E. Simon, Comment, The Patent Reform Act’s Proposed First-to-File Standard:
Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 129,
139–43 (2006). So far, no judicial challenge to the AIA’s change to a first-to-file patent
system has reached the appellate court level.
181 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894).
182 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (pre-AIA statute). Under the
interference system, in the rare case when two applicants claimed the same invention
and had the identical filing date and the identical date of invention, the internal USPTO
appeals board held that neither was entitled to the patent. Lassman v. Brossi, Gerecke,
& Kyburz, 159 U.S.P.Q. 182, 1967 WL 7458, at *1–3 (B.P.A.I. 1967).
183 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 289
(2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012 & Supp. V 2018))). The revisions
were designed to ensure that the first person to file a patent application is actually an
inventor. S. REP. No. 111-18, at 6 (2009).
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1. Status Quo
One possibility, of course, is to do nothing and await
developments. Even given the pace of private activity directed to
space exploration and exploitation, there is probably time to
think and debate, or to simply wait until there is an undesirable
result under current law and then attempt to fix it.184 This
approach has the advantage of deferring action until there is
more information about what problems might need to be
addressed. One thing that is predictable about innovation,
though, is that its timing is not predictable. Doing nothing until
a specific problem arises has its own risks.
By definition, maintaining the status quo maintains the
problems identified in Section III.A.: uncertainty regarding the
application of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of exclusion of
natural phenomena from the definition of statutory subject
matter under Section 101 (itself subject to considerable
uncertainty) to extraterrestrial phenomena.185
Likewise, by definition, maintaining the status quo also
maintains the problems regarding the definition of prior art
under Section 102, identified in Section III.B., (i.e., whether
technology only observed by a few in space should preclude
patentability of technology developed on Earth, and whether
properties that are only inherent in space should preclude
patentability of technology developed on Earth that uses such
properties). Literal application of the inherency doctrine would
limit the impact of extraterrestrial inherent prior art on
earthbound inventions. The doctrine requires that for a prior art
reference to anticipate a claim when a feature is not explicitly
disclosed, the missing feature must be “necessarily present, or
inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”186 Thus, if the
missing feature only occurs in space, it is not “necessarily present”
and should not anticipate a claim under the doctrine of inherency.
Likewise, by definition, maintaining the status quo
maintains the problems regarding the application of the
obviousness standard under Section 103, identified in Section
III.C, supra. In addition to the problems of geographic scope and
inherency, the question of whether to assume that an earthbound
184 This approach may assume that there is more time before solutions are
needed than is actually the case. See supra notes 7–12.
185 See generally Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject
Matter and Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 44–47 (2012)
[hereinafter Oppenheimer, Patents 101].
186 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citing Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see
Burk & Lemley, supra note 127, at 379.
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person of ordinary skill has complete knowledge of information
only available in space. At some point, space travel and
communication may become so common as to make this a
reasonable assumption, but at the moment (and for the foreseeable
future) the assumption stretches legal fiction to an extreme that is
difficult to justify. Winslow adopted the legal fiction that the person
determining obviousness knew all that people in the field could
know about the subject; it did not require that person to know
things that were generally unknown or unavailable.187
2. Everyone Wins?: Why Granting Patents to Both
Inventors Is Against Current Precedent
Rather than choose between an earthbound inventor and
an extraterrestrial inventor, a tempting solution is to award
patents to both. While intuitively “fair,” awarding the patent to
both would be contrary to current law188 and long-established
precedent.189 The statute could be amended to eliminate the
novelty impediment posed by Sections 101 and 102. However,
the precedent set by Miller v. Eagle190 and the constitutional
requirement that patents promote progress would certainly
raise issues regarding the grant of more than one patent on the
same innovation. In addition, there would be difficult
administrative issues to solve: for example, each patentee would
have the power to grant licenses, making it difficult to exercise
the market control which is the hallmark of patent rights.
While the specific problem that Section 101 poses
regarding novelty can be addressed by amending the statute,
this solution does not address the issue of patentable subject
matter under Section 101, which implicates not only the statute,
but the exceptions announced by the Supreme Court as a matter
of constitutional command.191
This solution would, however, eliminate the problems
relating to Section 102 (and therefore, because the obviousness
analysis under Section 103 is limited to materials available
under Section 102) those relating to Section 103 as well.

187
188
189
190
191

In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (requiring that the invention be “new.”).
See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894).
Id.
See discussion supra Section III.A.
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3. Universal Overhaul
An ambitious approach would be the creation of an
“extraterrestrial patent,” issued by an international organization,
and governing manufacture, use, or sale in, and importation into,
space.192 Putting aside the difficulty of negotiating such a treaty,
it would have the advantages of eliminating potentially
overlapping extraterrestrial jurisdictions with potentially
inconsistent rules, and of providing a central repository of prior
art so as to reduce the risk of inconsistent grants of patents.
It would, however, have the potential to impact
constitutional rights of nationals when in space, a step that
would be difficult to distinguish from the attempt to restrict
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of U. S. military families
living abroad found unconstitutional in Reid v. Covert.193 In
addition, setting up a regime that provided different rights for
earthbound and extraterrestrial innovations would be
challenging under the TRIPS treaty, which requires that patent
rights not vary based on location.194 Finally, this approach would
pose administrative issues similar to those presented by the
“everyone wins” approach.
While the specific problem that Section 101 poses
regarding novelty could be addressed by a treaty and conforming
amendments to the statute, the issue of patentable subject
matter under Section 101 poses constitutional issues.195 The
Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence is
based on the principles that “[p]henomena of nature . . . are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work”196 and “[l]aws of nature [are] free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none” because they are “part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all.”197 While, in the view of some,
192 One model that might be considered is the creation of a European Patent
Office (created by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents), that conducts
centralized review of patent applications and allows patents that may be enforced in all
of its member countries. See generally EPO—Home, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Apr. 4,
2019), https://www.epo.org/index.html [http://perma.cc/2YXU-FSB6], and for a list of
member countries, see Member States of the European Patent Organisation, European
Patent Office (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.epo.org/about-us/foundation/memberstates.html [https://perma.cc/T3DH-46BM].
193 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5, 15–19, 40–41 (1957) (holding an executive
agreement giving military courts exclusive jurisdiction over servicemen and their
families stationed abroad a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
194 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 77, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 311. The TRIPS
Agreement could, of course, be amended to accommodate special rules for
extraterrestrial innovation and enforcement of patent rights.
195 See discussion supra Section III.A.
196 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
197 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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Congress stretched the Constitution in adopting the first-to-file
patent system under the AIA,198 the constitutional stretch
required to permit patenting technology which is innovative on
Earth but natural in space would require distinguishing (or
limiting the broad language of) Supreme Court precedent.
Furthermore, a carefully drafted treaty and statutory
changes to implement the treaty provisions could resolve the
novelty issues under Section 102 (and therefore, because the
obviousness analysis under Section 103 is limited to materials
available under Section 102) those relating to Section 103 as well.
Care would need to be taken, however, to avoid adopting provisions
that would result in withdrawing anything from the public domain.
4. Forward to the Past
The United States, from its inception, only granted
patents to the “first inventor.”199 The first patent statute, enacted
in 1790, provided for a petition for patent by “any person or
persons . . . setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before
known or used.”200 The second patent statute, enacted in 1793,
provided for patents to be issued on petition by
any person . . . being a citizen . . . of the United States, . . . . [who has]
invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement of any art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used
before the application.201

See supra Section IV.A.2.
It is arguable that the U. S. abandoned the “first inventor” principle in
adopting the America Invents Act. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, Harmonization, supra note
23, at 449–55. Even under the AIA, however, patents are only granted to “an” inventor
and a showing that someone else invented the technology first will defeat an application.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 289 (2011)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). The U.S. has never
recognized “patents of importation.” As early as 1804, courts considered and rejected the
notion. See Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710)
(charging a jury that “if the invention was brought over [from Europe], that is, if it
appears that the plaintiff was not the original inventor, in reference to other parts of the
world as well as America, he is not entitled to a patent.”). Justice Story also rejected
patents of importation in several cases. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435, 437–38
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 11,645); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37–38 (C.C.D. Mass.
1817) (No. 1,217); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No.
17,971) (“[A] subsequent inventor cannot, by obtaining a patent therefor, oust the first
inventor of his right . . . . notwithstanding he may have been a subsequent inventor,
without any knowledge of the prior existence of the machine . . . .”).
200 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–10. An earlier version of the statute
would have authorized patents of importation. See infra notes 218–220.
201 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19.
198
199
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Subsequent amendments to the patent statute retained
the invention requirement.202 That is not, however, the only basis
on which patentability might be determined. Putting aside the
practice of granting royal monopolies to reward friends of (or
contributors to) the monarch,203 there was a long history of
granting patents not only to independent inventors but also to
individuals who observed the technology abroad (and therefore
were not independent inventors) but were the first to introduce
it to the jurisdiction—“patents of importation.”204 The U.S.
patent system was, in fact, the outlier when adopted. While
several early U.S. cases rejected patents of importation,205 most
European systems of the day allowed for a broader conception of
invention than embraced by the first U. S. patent statute. For
sound policy reasons, discussed below, they included within
their systems grants for introduction of new technologies from
abroad as well as for independent invention.206
While there are earlier records of incentives offered for
innovation,207 the first law providing a government-sanctioned
monopoly in return for innovation is generally thought to be the
Venetian Republic statute of March 19, 1474. The statute
provided that:
every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give
notice . . . when it has been reduced to perfection so that it can be used
and operated. It being forbidden to every other person in any of our
territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and

35 USC § 101 (2012).
A classic example is given in the English case of Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep.
1260 (1602), in which a monopoly was granted over the manufacture of playing cards.
204 Sean Carnathan argues that even the U.S. statutory term “first and true
inventor” as used in contemporary England “included a person who introduced . . . an
invention previously used in another country.” Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority
Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 773 (1998).
205 See cases cited supra note 199.
206 Although by then the U.S. had rejected patents of importation, there are
elements of the patent statutes which seem to have reflected similar policies. In re Tenney,
254 F.2d 619, 626 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (noting that § 102’s distinction between domestic and
foreign knowledge and use showed that it was “readily evident that what Congress was
concerned with, both in 1836 and 1952, was the probability that the subject matter would
be made known to the American public. Knowledge and use in the United States would
probably (or so Congress must have reasoned) become generally known, while the same
assumption could not be made with respect to such knowledge and use abroad.”).
207 Sybaris apparently awarded exclusive rights for one year to creators of new
recipes. M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 143, 143 (1945). There
are records of a patent awarded by the Republic of Florence as early as 1421 (issued to
Filippo Brunelleschi—the architect of the cathedral of Florence—for a barge with
hoisting gear). See id. at 144; see also CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 11 (2002).
202
203
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similar to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for
the term of [ten] years.208

The statute did not require “invention” in the modern sense, but only
that the claimant “build” a new device; it was intended to motivate
not only invention, but introduction of inventions from abroad.209
English practice before the Statute of Monopolies210
likewise offered a limited term monopoly for inventors and for
those who were the first to introduce a foreign invention into the
country.211 Writing in the 19th century, E. Wyndham Hulme
attempted to catalog the grants of monopolies in the U.K. prior
to the Statute of Monopolies.212 Among the grants he identifies,
the May 26, 1562 grant to Cobham for a dredging machine is
based, not on any evidence that Cobham had invented the
machine, but rather that “[t]he patentee represent[ed] that ‘by
diligent travel’ he had discovered a machine to scour the
entrances to harbours.”213 The patentee was therefore not an
inventor in the modern statutory sense of the word, but rather
was rewarded for having observed someone else’s invention
208 Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166,
177 (1948) (emphasis added).
209 “Now, if provision were made for the works and devices discovered by such
persons, so that others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor’s
honor away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build
devices of great utility and benefit to our commonwealth.” Id. at 176. Note that the
monopoly was available not only to the actual inventor, but also to the first to bring the
invention to the territory.
210 Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3.
211 “[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the
kingdom . . . or if a man hath made a new discovery of any thing . . . the King . . . may
grant by charter unto him, that he only shall use such . . . for a certain time.” The
Clothworkers of Ipswich Case [1615] 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (KB) (emphasis added). As
Lord Coke explained the rationale and its limits: “[A]t first the people of the kingdom
are ignorant and have not the knowledge or skill to use it: but when that patent is
expired, the King cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is become
common . . . there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it.” Id. Thus, it was
held that the Crown might lawfully grant exclusive privileges in a new invention, a new
discovery, or a new trade within the realm, for a limited time. See id. Modeled on the
United Kingdom Patent Law of 1852, Jamaica likewise permitted patents of importation.
See Pfizer, Ltd. v. Medimpex Jam., Ltd. [2014] UKPC 20. Section 3 of the statute provides
that “[w]henever any person . . . alleg[es] that he hath invented or discovered some new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not heretofore known or
used within this Island . . . it shall be lawful for the Governor-General, in the name of
and on behalf of Her Majesty, to direct Letters Patent, under the Broad Seal of this
Island, to be issued.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jamaica’s Patent Act of 1857)
Portugal also adopted, by decree in 1892, a law authorizing the grant of patent
monopolies “for the manufacture of any new industrial products . . . . [with] ‘new
industry’ . . . defined as one not actually in process of working in the country at the date
of application.” E. Wyndham Hulme, History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative
and at Common Law, 12 L. Q. REV. 141, 154 (1896).
212 See Hulme, supra note 211, at 141–54.
213 Id. at 145.
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abroad and having been the first to bring it into the country.
Hulme also reports on a 1571 grant to Richard Dyer “for the
manufacture of earthen fire-pots, an art which he had learned
in exile [in Portugal].”214 Again, the patentee did not invent the
technology, he learned it from others (and was therefore not an
inventor in the modern statutory sense)—but he introduced it
into the country. Hulme argues that, even under the Statute of
Monopolies, which “confined the legitimate exercise of the
prerogative to the true and first inventor,” the term “inventor”
as understood at the time was not confined to the mental act of
invention but was broad enough to cover the first importer of
technology215 and explains:
[T]he Crown and Courts alike recognized two classes of
individuals . . . as the proper recipients of royal favour, (1) the
bringer-in or importer, (2) the first finder or inventor—the latter
grounding his title to favourable consideration on the fact that he
possessed in common with the importer the qualification of
introducing a new industry within the realm.216

Support for this rationale for patents of importation is offered by
The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case:
[T]he King . . . cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away freetrade, which is the birthright of every subject. . . . But if a man hath
brought in a new invention . . . within the kingdom, in peril of his life,
and consumption of his estate or stock, &c. or if a man hath made a new
discovery . . . in such cases the King of his grace and favour, in
recompence . . . may grant . . . that he only shall use such . . . for a
certain time because at first the people of the kingdom are ignorant. and
have not the knowledge or skill to use it.217

The United States itself considered authorizing patents of
importation,218 an approach that appears to have had the
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151; see also id. at 151 n.1 (“The connotation of the term ‘inventor’ has
been unduly restricted. It is used indifferently in these grants with such phrases as ‘the
first finder out,’ ‘discoverer . . . ’ [etc.]. The word ‘invenio,’ I come upon, denotes primarily
a physical act rather than a mental process. The Act sought to vest these privileges in
those who had actually contributed to the introduction of the new art . . . .”).
216 Id. at 152.
217 The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case [1615], 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (KB);
Accord In re Edgeberry & Stephens [1691], 91 Eng. Rep. 387, 387 (KB) (holding that the
term “inventor” in the Statute of Monopolies encompasses the first importer).
218 H.R. 41, as originally introduced treated as an inventor the first to import
an invention “not before known or used within the United States.” H.R. 41, 1st Cong.
(1790), reprinted in 6 THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS PROJECT, THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH
4, 1789–MARCH 3, 1791 at 1626–32 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds, Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1972) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. This section was deleted before
passage of H. R. 41 as the Patent Statute of 1790. Id. at 1632–37. As originally
introduced, H.R. 41 (the successor to the prior session’s H.R. 10) added a section
214
215
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support of George Washington,219 but language explicitly
deeming the first importer as an inventor was deleted from the
final version of the bill which became the first patent statute.220
The Patent Act of 1836 was the first to include an explicit
provision denying a patent if the invention had been described
in a pre-existing printed publication.221 It distinguished between
denial based on printed publications and denial based on
knowledge or use. The statute provided that
if . . . it shall not appear . . . that the same had been . . . described in any
printed publication in this or any foreign country, or had been in public
use or on sale . . . prior to the application, . . . it shall be [the
Commissioner’s] duty to issue a patent therefor.222

The underlying rationale for granting patents of
importation adopted by Queen Elizabeth I was “to stimulate
domestic production of both raw materials and a wide variety of
manufactured goods previously imported from abroad.”223 Faced
with the goal of motivating innovation in order to generate
revenue, plus the recognition that new worlds were opening and
those new worlds had domestically unavailable technology,
these countries adopted the view that importers of such
technology deserved rewards on a par with those who
independently developed innovations—the economic benefits to
the national economy were similar.

expressly providing that the first importer of an invention be treated as if the original
inventor. That provision was deleted and (as with many early actions related to patent
law) there is no formal legislative history explaining why. Walterscheid, however, offers
the possibility that concerns were raised concerning the constitutionality of patents of
importation. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the
Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 445, 506–09 (1997) [hereinafter Walterscheid,
Charting a Novel Course].
219 “The advancement of agriculture, commerce and manufactures, by all proper
means, will not, I trust, need recommendation. But I cannot forbear intimating to you,
the expediency of giving effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of new and
useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius in producing them
at home . . . .” George Washington “State of the Union” Address (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 251, 253.
220 “No copy specifically identified as H.R. 10 has been found, and what is
known about it comes from indirect sources.” Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course,
supra note 218, at 462–63. “Nonetheless, an unidentified typescript of a combined
copyright and patent bill unearthed at the Library of Congress in 1955 is now considered
to be H.R. 10, because H.R. 10 is the only known combined bill attempted by the
Congress.” Id. at 466.
221 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
222 § 7, 5 Stat. at 119 (emphasis added).
223 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent
Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855 (1994).
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A similar rationale could apply to extraterrestrial technology
today.224 The risks and costs of space exploration are enormous, in
many cases greater than the risks and costs of independent
development.225 The impacts on the economy are potentially the
same—the origin of the technology has no effect on its value, except
with respect to the decision whether to invest in developing the
technology, and that decision is heavily influenced by the likelihood
of recovering the costs of development. The availability of patents is
a major component in evaluating that likelihood.
The Constitution only authorizes grants of limited term
monopolies to authors and inventors.226 The question may be raised
whether patents of importation could fit within that authorization.
It is tempting to respond that the constitutional line has already
been crossed with the passage of the AIA, awarding patents to the
first filer rather than the first inventor. Although many
commentators argued that this ran afoul of the “authors and
inventors” requirement,227 Congress thought the AIA
constitutional. Support can be found in the common understanding
of the word “invention,” during the formative years of the
antecedents of U. S. patent law, as including both invention and
discovery228 (and even the current U.S. patent statute defines
“invention” as “invention or discovery”).229 The proper inquiry is
whether the concept furthers national policy, under the conditions
that prevail at the time. The conditions that prevail today
regarding space exploration are quite similar to the conditions that
prevailed in seventeenth and eighteenth century England—there
are potential resources in locations that will be visited by few and
only at great risk and expense.230 For the moment, this is an
appropriate approach to patents, even for “naturally occurring”
224 For example, Queen Elizabeth’s position vis-a-vis contemporary continental
Europe can be seen as similar to the current state of terrestrial vis-a-vis extraterrestrial
technology: there may be technologies in space that would be useful on earth, but significant
barriers separate the two. Rewards are appropriate for those who surmount those barriers.
225 As long as costs were borne by governments, this factor would not matter.
Now that private entities are venturing into the field and making economic decisions,
economic motivation does matter. See supra notes 7–12.
226 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
227 See discussion supra note 180.
228 The standard dictionary of the day would have been Johnson’s Dictionary of
the English Language, which defined “inventor” as “a [finder] of something not known
before.” A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1122 (1st ed., 1755),
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/page-view/?i=1122 [https://perma.cc/2SQ6-P2WV].
229 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (emphasis added).
230 If conditions change, it would certainly be appropriate to change the rules,
as Congress and the courts have done regarding the definition of prior art in the past.
See Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere, supra note 174, at 249–58 (describing the evolution
of the definition of “printed publication” in response to technological change); see also
Section III.B., supra.
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materials discovered in space but previously unknown on earth.
Like Dyer and his fire-pot, the first party to bring such a substance
“not heretofore known or used within this Island.”231 Earth should
be rewarded for the risk and expense of introducing the new
material to Earth’s storehouse of knowledge.
As with the other models, there would be a constitutional
issue regarding patentability of principles of nature—the
Supreme Court has never been asked to clarify whether only
natural phenomena that occur on Earth are included.232 This
model would, however, offer a solution to the novelty issue
presented under Section 101.233 By allowing “the first to
introduce” to apply for a patent on a par with “the first inventor
to file,” and (as required by the AIA) awarding the patent to the
first to file an application with the USPTO, the model limits the
technology to one patent. This would, of course, be the result
under the current system. What the patent of importation model
adds, however, is the assurance that one of the two applicants will
receive a patent; under the current system, there is the possibility
that neither would receive a patent. Instead of inhibiting
innovation by introducing this risk, it introduces a new element
of competition—between research and exploration—which should
lead to greater innovation. In addition, the administrative issues
discussed in Part IV would be eliminated.234 Because only one
patent is granted, the patentee would have the power to grant
exclusive licenses and thereby maintain market control.
As discussed, there are unresolved issues as to the
application of Section 102 to prior art from space, particularly the
date upon which it becomes prior art.235 Giving the “first importer”
the right to seek a patent would encourage introducing the new
technology into the prior art at the earliest possible date. Because
only one patent is to be issued, both an explorer and a researcher
have an incentive to file an application as soon as possible.
Therefore, the first to the patent office will presumably be acting
before anyone else has the invention, and nothing will be withdrawn
from the public domain.
As to the inherency issue, the current interpretation should
adequately protect earthbound innovators. As currently
231 See Hulme, supra note 211, at 150. Discoveries in space which were already
known on Earth should not be patentable for the policy reasons discussed supra Section
III and expressed, for example, in the quoted Jamaican statute cited supra note 211.
232 See discussion supra Section III.A.
233 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1984); see also discussion
supra notes 189–190.
234 See supra Section III.C.2.
235 See supra Section III.B.
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interpreted, “[i]nherency . . . may not be established by
probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may
result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”236 Thus,
if a phenomenon only exists under certain conditions—for example,
only in the vacuum and extreme temperature of outer space—it
cannot qualify as inherent.
By dealing with the issues under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the model
also deals with those relating to Section 103.237 It also helps
resolve—or, more accurately, avoid—the questions relating to how
much the Winslow person of ordinary skill knows.238 By encouraging
prompt disclosure of information learned in space, the problem of
whether to include information only known in space is reduced—
once the information is brought to Earth, the problem disappears.
V.

CHOOSING A SOLUTION: PROMOTING INNOVATION BY
PROTECTING INNOVATORS

The choice of solution depends on the choice of goals. If
patents are viewed as anti-competitive in the aggregate, then the
ideal solution would be one that limited patents to the extent
possible. Extraterrestrial discoveries, under this view, should be
available as invalidating prior art to the maximum degree.239 On the
other hand, if patents are viewed as pro-growth, then the ideal
solution would be one that gave inventors certainty as to
expectations should they receive a patent on the theory that the
patent incentive encourages innovation and that innovation is of
benefit to society.240 Both views have their adherents.241
Accepting the constitutional goal of promoting progress (as
opposed, say, to reducing prices in the short term) by providing
limited term exclusivity to innovators, a solution should provide a
sufficient degree of certainty that successful innovation will be
rewarded. The theory of patent grants as promoters of progress is
that the marketplace (not the government) will finance innovation
236 See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added)
(quoting Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
237 See supra Section III.C.3.
238 See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (in which the court
assumed that in determining whether an invention was patentable or not, all relevant
information was completely known).
239 If that is the goal, an even better solution would be to repeal the patent
statute entirely.
240 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV.
371, 375 (2015) [hereinafter Oppenheimer, The Innovator’s Dilemma].
241 Any individual patent, viewed in isolation, is clearly anti-competitive—
preventing others from using the claimed technology to compete is the purpose of the
patent. Viewed in the aggregate, however, it is necessary to also consider the incentive
to innovate and recall that, absent the innovation represented by the patent, society
would not have the advance in the first place.
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by assuring monopoly profits for innovation. To the extent that there
is doubt regarding the availability of this reward, the incentive to
innovate is reduced.242 Any solution that introduces new uncertainty
as to patentability of an invention will reduce the incentive to
innovate, the ability to finance innovation243 and therefore the
amount of innovation.
Any modification of the rules, whether by treaty or by
statute, introduces uncertainty—new interpretations are required,
or reaffirmation of existing interpretations to the new rule.244 While
that is unavoidable, some modifications change uncertainty by
design, changing the rules to favor or disfavor innovators.
A resolution must deal with two broad categories of issues:
treatment of extraterrestrial activity for the purpose of
establishing the right to a patent, and treatment of extraterrestrial
activity for the purpose of defeating an existing patent. Viewed
another way, the resolution must deal with pre-patent activity
differently than post-patent activity.
Both discoveries and inventions made in space should be
eligible for patent protection—they, like any other invention or
discovery, further progress. Even discoveries—as opposed to
inventions—in space should be eligible for patent protection if they
introduce technology not previously available on Earth. Discoveries
in space should not, however, be allowed to displace previouslyapplied for patents—the progress has already been made at the
point of patent application and if the public did not have access to
the technology at that point, the applicant has fulfilled the inventor’s
part of the patent bargain.
This approach is consistent with the early “patents of
importation” approach to the opening of new worlds with new
technology bases. To the extent that it is inconsistent with current
law, the inconsistency arises, not from constitutional requirement or
the words of the patent statute, but from judicial interpretation.245
See Oppenheimer, The Innovator’s Dilemma, supra note 240, at 387.
An investor in research and development is taking the risk that the research
will actually produce the desired innovation and the risk that the innovation will be
successful in the marketplace. These are typically large risks—minor innovations are
generally unpatentable because of the non-obviousness requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012
& Supp. V 2018). In order to compensate for these risks, there must be a comparably large
potential for profit and that profit typically can only be protected by patents.
244 When the patent statute was amended in 1952 to introduce an explicit
prohibition on patenting “obvious” inventions—a rule that had been in place through
judicial interpretation since the 1851 case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 269
(1851)—it took a Supreme Court decision to confirm that there was still a prohibition on
patenting “obvious” inventions, Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966), and
the contours of “obviousness” remained contentious as recently as 2007. See KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
245 This judicial interpretation has been inconsistent, and has drawn criticism from
lower courts and the patent office, which argue such interpretation is inconsistent and lacking
242
243
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The approach is also consistent with the path followed by the
courts in the evolution of the interpretation of the term “printed
publication” in response to developments in the technology of
disseminating information. Printed publications were initially
treated differently from other sources of prior art (knowledge and
use), on the theory that books traveled more easily and more
invariably than word of mouth, and initially were limited to ink on
paper. As communications technology advanced, the meaning of
“printed publication” expanded to include other forms of
permanently recorded information and eventually to internet
publications.246 Similarly, as space travel becomes common, the
concept of prior art from space can likewise evolve—and if Congress
believes the evolution is too slow or proceeding in the wrong
direction, it can amend the statute as it has done with respect to the
definition of prior art from other countries.
CONCLUSION
Current patent law is ill-equipped to deal with an influx of
technology from outer space. That influx may still be decades in the
future, so some may argue that it is well to delay changing the patent
law until there is more information on the challenges actually posed
by extraterrestrial discoveries. Often it is better to defer statutory
changes until the impact of a catalyst is well-understood; this
reduces the risk of overreaction or of reaction to the wrong challenge.
In this case, however, it is unlikely that the impetus to
commercialize space exploration will abate, and several problems
have already been identified (and are unlikely to change). Acting
now to clarify the potential patent rewards that space exploration
will offer may, in fact, provide a needed incentive to make the
enormous investments that such exploration will require.
Each of the potential solutions analyzed above has its
advantages and disadvantages—what is an advantage and what is
a disadvantage depends, of course, on what policy is being pursued,
but that too is unlikely to change. It is therefore time to begin the
discussion of how to use the patent system for the purpose it was
designed for—to encourage progress—by motivating the
expenditures necessary to search for and exploit what new
technology might await in outer space.
in theoretical foundation. For a detailed review of the criticism of the Supreme Court’s
approach to statutory subject matter and an argument that the Court has usurped the
legislature’s authority, see Oppenheimer, Patents 101, supra note 185, at 44–47.
246 For a detailed description of the evolution of the concept of printed
publication, and a proposal for an approach to handling emerging technologies under
patent law, see Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere, supra note 174, at 243–58.

